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Abstract 
The sequential increase in China’s military expenditure has caused a worldwide debate. Aiming at one jurisdiction that the increase 
in military expenditure helps to stabilize the rising unemployment rate, and knowing the defense-unemployment nexus is barely 
researched in the context of China, this study manage to verify the validity of this jurisdiction and to plug the vacancy in China 
with empirical approaches using data from 1991 to 2013. After testing the time-series properties of the four variables 
(unemployment rate, military expenditure, non- military expenditure and GDP), the ARDL (Autoregressive Distributed Lag) model 
is applied as the basis to our estimation. To our surprise, the military expenditure pushes up the unemployment rate, whereas the 
increase in its non-military counterpart presses down the rate. The results manifest that the jurisdiction is devoid of grounds, and, 
more notably, that the two parts of the China’s government spending boast opposite economic impact. 
© 2015 Li qiong, Hu Junhua. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of IISES-International Institute for Social and Economics Sciences. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2015 draft budget report released by Chinese Ministry of Finance showed that China’s budgeted central 
defence spending is 886.898 billion yuan (approximately 141 billion dollars), which increased 10.1% from last year, 
and national defence budget (including defence budget in local fiscal expenditure) is 911.49 billion yuan 
(approximately 144.9 billion dollars), presenting a 10% increase from last year. This means china’s defence 
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expenditure has achieved a double-digit growth in five consecutive years since 2010, with the 10.1% increase in 2015 
being the lowest in the five years. According to the spokesman of Ministry of Defence, the increase in the defence 
budget is mainly used for the following four purposes: increasing investment in weapons and equipment, improving 
military training conditions, enhancing personnel benefits, and support military reform needs.  
There are many justifications for this governmental decision. Even though the defence spending kept rising in the 
last five years, the defence burden was 2% on average, which was quite low compared to that of U.S. (a minimum of 
3%) and other European countries(all above 2%), indicating that China’s military expenditure was relatively restrained. 
Therefore, it is plausible to level up the country’s defence spending with its economic development. Also, in order for 
China to fight against new threats and to be in the wake of the world-wide new military reform wave, the country 
should increase its whole defence budget and subsequently the budget for renovating military equipment. In 2014, 
China’s growth rate of GDP decreased to the lowest (7.6%) since 1990. Furthermore, the policy to delay retirement 
age has caused the controversy over its influence on the unemployment rate. Under such circumstances, another 
justification in favour of higher defence spending then appeared, reasoning that the growth in defence spending would 
create more job opportunities in military department, and consequently stimulate the public employment, and therefore 
lower the unemployment rate. 
Given all above, this paper attempts to evaluate the impacts of military expenditure on unemployment by using an 
empirical estimation strategy. To achieve this goal, first, we brief on relevant literature concerning this subject, and 
then expound on the model and the data used in analysing the relationship between military expenditure and 
unemployment. The results, together with the conclusion drawn from it, are presented in the last part of this paper.  
2. Literature review 
Unemployment is commonly used only as a specific indicator to reflect the economic growth. Due to its wider 
applicability, defence-growth relationship is more frequently researched than defence-unemployment relationship. 
Benoit (1973) triggered the so-far-unsettled debate by identifying the surprisingly positive correlation between 
military expenditure and economic growth in 44 less developed countries. With the increasing number of underlying 
frameworks and econometric approaches being applied to diverse situations, the results differ dramatically. Among 
those few studies on defence-unemployment relationship, Dunne and Smith (1990) found no connection between 
defence spending and unemployment in OECD countries, which is confirmed by Payne and Ross (1992). However, 
the no-connection conclusion is challenged by Abell (1992) whose work showed that the relationship depends on 
different races, Paul (1996) who believed the results varied in a country-level, and Tang et al. (2009) who found a 
positive nexus in non-OECD countries.  
China, as the biggest developing country in the world, has chosen a completely disparate path from that of western 
countries to achieve its prosperity, which put the applicability of previously-identified results to China into question. 
Moreover, the best part of researches targeting on China are tackling with its defence-growth relation. The absence of 
studies concerning defence-unemployment nexus, and the magnitude of this subject for governmental decision 
necessitate the study of this nexus in the context of China. 
3. Model and data 
Theoretically, as typically represented by Okun’s law, economic growth means increase in the labour force 
requirement, that is, increase in the ability of the economy to absorb the surplus labour force, and therefore reduction 
in the unemployment level. Nevertheless, the contradiction existing on both theoretical level (a positive relation) and 
empirical level (sometimes showed a negative relation) obscures the interaction between economic development and 
unemployment. Despite this contradiction, one point can be assured is that economic growth does cast influence on 
changes in unemployment. Naturally, the growth rate of GDP should be included as one of the variables. 
Besides, Abell (1992) and Paul (1996) argued that military expenditure and non-military expenditure do not have 
identical effects on unemployment. The split of government spending is conducive to the identification of military 
expenditure effects and to the recommendation for economic policy-making. Therefore, our model is presented as 
follows: 
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Where tu  is the current unemployment, tg  means the current growth rate of GDP, tm  denotes the current share of 
military expenditure to GDP, tnm  represents the share of non-military expenditure to GDP, and tH  indicates the 
residuals. 
Four empirical indicators covering the period 1991-2013 are assigned to corresponding variables: 
Ь tu is the annual Unemployment rate from World Bank, interpreted as percentage of Total Labour Force, it 
uses Modelled ILO Estimate.  
Ь tg is the annual growth rate of GDP comes from World Bank. 
Ь tm is the share of military expenditure to GDP from SIPRI database. 
Ь tnm  is the share of non-military expenditure to GDP. The difference between government spending and 
military expenditure is allocated to non-military expenditure. Data for general government expenditure are from the 
IMF World Economic Outlook, and include spending by all levels of govt.: central/federal, state/provincial/regional, 
municipal and local government, etc. 
The period that this research referred to depends highly on the availability of the data. 
4. Tests and results 
The choice of the estimate technique varied with different time-series properties of variables separated and 
aggregated. Here, we apply ADF test to check the existence of unit root, for the purpose of examining the time-series 
properties. From Table 1, we can conclude that unemployment rate and GDP show unit root process, while military 
expenditure and non-military expenditure are stationary. In other words, the variables have disparate orders of 
integration. 
Table 1 ADF test 
Variable Intercept, Trend, Lags ADF value Order of Integration 
tu  (I, 0, 0 ) -4.93 I(1) 
tg  (I, 0, 0 ) -5.36 I(1) 
tm  (I, T, 4) -4.15 I(0) 
tnm  (I, T, 3) -3.92 I(0) 
Given the dissimilar quality of variable series, the prerequisites for co-integration test are not satisfied and so are 
the estimation techniques built on the existence of co-integration relationship among variables. ARDL (Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag) approach, with its advantage that the time-series properties of variables are not required in its 
application, enables us to identify both long-run relationship and short-run fluctuations among variables. Apart from 
these, ARDL approach has little limitations. It is suitable for small sample, residual serial correlation and endogenous 
regressors. We establish the following equation according to the ARDL model: 
0 0, 1, 2, 3, 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1
1 1 1 1
d
n n n n
t i t i i t i i t i i t i t t t t
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Where d  is the difference operator and n  the number of lags of each variable. 
The null hypothesis is: H0: 0G = 1G = 2G = 3G , and the alternative hypothesis is: H1: 0G z 0, 1G  z 0, 2G z 0, 3G z 0. 
According to Pesaran (2001), the F statistic is used in this hypothesis test. The null hypothesis is rejected when the F 
value is higher than the upper limit, which indicates that there exists a long-run relationship among variables, and the 
conclusion is opposite if the F value is smaller than the lower limit; the result is inconclusive if the F value lies in 
between. 
1 2 3t t t t tu C g m nmE E E H    
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Fig. 1. CUSUM  
 
Fig. 2. CUSUMQ  
The lag structure of the ARDL equation  , ,t t t tu f g m nm  is the same under both Akaike Information and 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion, which is ARDL (1, 0, 1, 0). The F statistics is 7.15, which is above the upper bound 
(Equals to 4.22 computed by Narayan (2005)). Therefore, a long-run relationship among variables is confirmed.  
The results of diagnostic test are shown in Table 2. All the items imply the good properties of residuals. 
Table 2 Diagnostic test 
Test statistics LM value probability 
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Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals
502   Li Qiong and Hu Junhua /  Procedia Economics and Finance  30 ( 2015 )  498 – 504 
Serial Correlation F2(1)= 1.15 0.28 
Functional Form F2(1)= 3.98 0.05 
Normality F2 (2)= 0.23 0.89 
Heteroscedasticity F2 (1)=0.081 0.78 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 is plot of the CUSUM and CUSUMQ tests respectively. Clearly, the statistics lies between 
the bounds, meaning the estimated equation is stable and thus practically applicable. 
All the outcomes of the tests above constitute the prerequisites of the regression analysis. Now, we turn to the 
regression results. As is shown in Table 3, all the parameters are significant. 
Table 3 Long-run coefficients 
According to the plus-minus sign of the long-run coefficients, unemployment rate is negatively affected by the 
growth rate of GDP and the share of non-military expenditure to GDP. The study result between GDP and 
unemployment that economic growth improves unemployment situation conforms to the Okun’s law.  
Surprisingly, the two parts of public spending present distinctly imparity. In one hand, military expenditure 
positively relates to unemployment, while non-military counterpart does exactly the opposite. The reason behind could 
be the different capital intensity and the distinct period or way of the circulation of capital in each sector. Moreover, 
the final products of each sector are distinguishable by nature and consequently exert variant impact on unemployment. 
That is, defense sector only creates pure public goods, whereas its non-defense counterpart also produces quasi-public 
goods, one kind of public goods with a limited non-exclusive and non-competitive nature. In the other hand, judging 
from the magnitude of the coefficients, defense spending exerts 10 times greater impact on unemployment than non-
defense spending. It is nothing unexpected due to the uneven ratio between the two kinds of spending. 
As for the short-run representation in Table 4, all the coefficients have strictly the same signs, but smaller magnitude, 
compared to those of long-run. Specifically, economic condition and non-military expenditure change in the same 
direction with the change in unemployment rate, but military expenditure change in the opposite. And they are 
significant except the error-correction term. ECT indicates the level of adjustments of the short-run deviations from 
long-run equilibrium. 
However, it may not be a one-way relationship. We also need to check for the endogeneity issue. The 
specification is then altered as  , ,t t t tm f u g nm , on which the same procedure is operated. The corresponding 
F value under this new function equals to 6.56, which is greater than the 95% upper bound. Thus, the long-run 
relationship between unemployment and defense spending exists. The estimation results are that the long-term 
coefficient of unemployment is positive but not significant3 to military expenditure, and the short-term results stay 
constant. This means the reverse causality could not be underpinned by our analysis. Hence, our study reveals a 
unidirectional causality relationship that the military expenditure causes the unemployment rather than the other way 
round. 
Table 4 Error Correction Representation 
Repressors Coefficients Standard Error T-Ratio 
dg  -0.130 0.009 -14.6235 
dm  0.363 0.088 4.1416 
dnm  -0.041 0.012 -3.5567  e 1ct   -0.128 0.09 -1.419 
 
 
3  F value equals to 2.36, and the probability is 0.107 
Repressors Coefficients Standard Error T-Ratio 
g  -1.013 0.055 9.4350 
m  2.838 0.736 -2.4745 
nm  -0.323 0.047 3.668 
C  0.036 0.017 2.151 
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Again, the connection of the government spending in general to the unemployment rate varies according to changing 
conditions. Nevertheless, the long-run and short-run consequences of the two divisions of the public spending are not 
identical in both the direction and magnitude. 
5. Conclusions
This study looks mainly into the relationship between defense spending and unemployment. In the meantime, we 
also compare the effect of defense and non-defense spending on unemployment. Restrained by the availability of data, 
the time span spreads from 1991 to 2013. Given the properties of gathered time series, ARDL model is the best choice. 
After passing several essential hypothesis tests, our robust results imply that an increase in military spending raises 
the unemployment rate, and an increase in non-military counterpart reduces it with a near 10 times lower magnitude 
than military spending4.  
Tracing the difference in the plus-minus signs into its source, we insist that military expenditure is highly planned 
to fund the update and repair of the military equipment, the maintaining of the personnel size and the keeping of daily 
operation in military force. And, during the analyzed period, China had experienced the disarmament twice (start 
respectively in 1997 and 2003). Therefore, the increase in China’s military expenditure could be considered as 
diverting capital resource in an unproductive way, and hardly doing some improvements to the employment condition. 
Also, the mounting arms procurement casts a limited effect on the market.  
Unlike defense spending, non-defense spending is more of a kind of investment injected to the market. Especially, 
in an economy like China, whose economic growth is mainly driven by investment, it is plausible for our results to 
present an appreciable negative relation between non-military expenditure and unemployment. More importantly, in 
the composition of the non-military expenditure, there are two sorts of spending having bearings with the dependent 
variable.  The social security and employment expenditure acts directly on employment, and straightly enables the 
non-military expenditure to reduce unemployment level. The expanding of educational scale, another portion of non-
military spending relating to the unemployment, makes indirectly but remarkable effects to employment.  
Regarding to the numerical size of the coefficients, as aforementioned, it is because different weights are put on 
the two kinds of public spending in the model that defense spending bears a magnified magnitude. In particular, the 
military expenditure only takes up a tiny part of GDP (the average defense burden is approximately 2%), whereas the 
non-military expenditure accounts for a dramatically larger proportion (nearly 16%). In other words, how an increase 
in public spending as a whole would influence the unemployment rate will hinge upon the weights, as well as the 
percentage that each one in the pair of public spending actually grow. Both positive and negative effects are possible 
and theoretically-based: government spending can bring more job opportunities into the society by inputting more 
investments into the economy in order for stimulating private investment, which is the bedrock of the government 
intervention theory; however, the interest rate would rise in response to the increased government debt and therefore 
more costly for private investor to get a loan, which would hinder the private investment to create more jobs.  The 
arguments above underpinned the practice implication of the results. Back to the start point of this study, we are able 
to conclude that the argument that higher defense spending contributes to depressed unemployment rate is gratuitous. 
Deeper exploration into the defense-unemployment nexus is still necessary, with more available data and a longer 
time span. Besides, the results from analyzing the subdivision of both military and non-military spending would be 
more cogent. 
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